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Absuact
Our chapter identifies key dimensions on which organizations make employee compensation decisions
and examines the emerging research evidence on the consequences of such decisions for attitudes, behaviors,
and organization performance. We provide some general suggestions that may prove helpful in future
research. First, there is increased recognition that pay decisions take place in the context of implicit or
explicit contracts between employees and specific organizations. As a result, we encourage researchers to
continue to give greater attention to the role of organization differences in compensation. Second, because
pay is multidimensional, attention should not be restricted to organization differences in pay level.
Organization differences in benefits, structure, and means of recognizing individual employees contributions
also warrant attention. As an example of how the focus can be expanded, we provide new empirical
evidence on organization differences in the market sensitivity of pay structures. Third, we note that the
success of pay programs depends not only on decisions about pay per se, but also the process used in making
communicating, and administering such decisions. More broadly, the influence of contextual factors, such as
the nature of other employee relations practices (e.g., staffmg, development, employment security), needs to be
considered to a greater extent in compensation research. In addition to these broad suggestions, we provide
specific ideas on future research directions throughout the chapter.
Key Tenns
Pay Level, Pay Mix, Pay Structure, Market Sensitivity, Participation in Decision Making, Employee Benefits,
Compensation Communication
The employment relationship can be thought of as an exchange process where employees provide
contributions such as ski11and effon in return for various inducements from the employer (March & Simon,
1958). This relationship has been conceived as a contract, either explicit (as in a wriuen collective bargaining
agreement) or implicit, that carries reciprocal obligations and returns for both panies (Azariadis, 1975;
Barnard, 1936; Rousseau, 1990; Simm, 1951; Williamson, Wachter, & Harris, 1975). Policies having to do
with employee relations, employment security, and compensation, which might otherwise be difficult to
explain, are sometimes more readily understood in this contexL
The focus of this chapter is on payor compensation (the terms used interchangeably here), a key
issue in most employment relationships. From the perspective of the employee, pay has an imponant
influence on Standard of living, status, and security. Less direct forms of compensation such as health care,
pensions, and other benefits also have an imponant impact on employees' well-being. From the employer's
point of view, compensation is both a major cost of doing business that needs to be controlled, and an
investment that must generate adequate returns in terms of employee auitudes, skills, behaviors, and
organization performance.
A major task from a human resource management and industrial relations perspective is to understand
how to design and administer compensation policies that best meet the goals (panly overlapping, partly
conflicting) of employers and employees in the employment exchange. As, however, the most recent review
of compensation and performance published in an IRRA research volume (Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 1987)
noted, there have been significant gaps in the knowledge needed to do so: "Our survey of the literature on
the relationship between the compensation policies a firm pursues and its economic performance leads us
inevitably to the concJusion that we know very litlIe about it" (p. 113).
Although there remains, of course, a great deal to learn, some progress has been made in the years
since the Ehrenberg and Milkovich review. In the present chapter, we survey some of the recent evidence on
pay and performance. An earlier paper of ours (Gerhart & Milkovich, fonhcoming) provides a comprehensive
review of the measurement, determinants, and consequences (including performance) of compensation
decisions. We draw on that review to some extent here.
The present chapter has three defining features. First, we emphasize that compensation decisions and
employment contracts occur in the context of specific (and differing) organizations. An implication for
research is thal organization differences in pay decisions should be an important focus, as should the
determinants and consequences of such differences. Empirically, this means that more data need to be
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colJected using me organization as me sampling unit
Moreover, because pay is multidimensionaJ (Ehrenberg &. Milkovich, 1987; Heneman, 1985; Heneman
&. Schwab, 1979), breaking out into level, structure, individual pay detennination, benefits, and administration
issues, organization differences on each dimension need to be identified and evaJuated in tenns of their
sighificance. To the degree that such differences are large, their determinants and consequences warrant
study.
Second, 10 reinforce our points regarding the imponance of organization differences and the need to
look beyond pay level, we present new empirical evidence on organization differences in the market
sensitivity of their internaJ pay suuctures.
A third and final focus is on the potentiaJ imponance of process or administration issues in the
success or failure of pay decisions (Gerhart &. Milkovich, forthcoming; Gomez-Mejia &. Balkin, 1992).
Employee participation in decision-making (PDM) receives the bulk of our attention in this area, panly
because general PDM research is fairly extensive and partly because of the important role attached to it in a
recent volume of review essays on pay and productivity (Blinder, 1990). In addition, however, we discuss the
potentiaJ importance of communication and fairness in the compensation area. The fact that employment
relationships or contracts are often of a long-term nature reinforces the importance of such issues. In
administration, as in the other areas of compensation, organization differences may be significant
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the genera] trend toward organization level research in
compensation. We then proceed to each dimension (i.e., pay level, pay mix, etc.) in turn, focusing, where
available, on evidence regarding organization differences. Similarly, research on the perfonnance
consequences of such differences is covered to the extent such work exists. Because the bulk of this research
has been conducted in the area of pay mix (or individual pay detennination), a sizeable portion of the review
is devoted to pay mix issues.
THE RESURGENCE OF INTEREST IN ORGANIZATION DIFFERENCES
The growing recognition and consensus that compensation research needs to focus more on
organizations and how they differ is, of course, consistent with the work conducted during the 1940s and
19505 by a group of economists that Segal (1986) has referred to as "post-institutionalists" (e.g., Dunlop,
1957; Lester, 1946; Reynolds, 195]). Their focus was on the "actuaJ operation of the Jabor market" (Segal.
p. 389), which led to many of the assumptions of neoclassical economics being questioned. On both the
supply and demand side, empirical observation identified factors that reduced the degree of pure competition,
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and thus, the extent to which rums' decisions were dictated by market forces. As a result, the post-
3
institutionalist model emphasized that rums enjoyed a significant degree of discretion in choosing how much
to pay their employees. However. with important exceptions (e.g., Doeringer &. Piore, 1971; Thurow, 1975;
Williamson, 1975), this interest among economists in organizational differences seemed to have been relatively
dormant during the 1960s and into the mid 1980s.
Among the recent developments are empirical work by Groshen (1988, 1991), Leonard (1988), and
Gerhan and Milkovich (1990) on organization differences in pay level and by Gerhart and Milkovich (1990)
and Brown (1990) on organization differences in the extent to which variable pay systems are used. In
addition, numerous special journal issues have appeared on compensation, often focusing on organization
differences. Examples include: the "New Economics of Personnel" Qoumal of Labor Economics, October
1987), "The Economics of Human Resource Management", (Jndustrial Relations, Spring 1990) and "Do
Compensation Policies Mauer? andustrial and Labor Relations Review, February 1990). The Brookings
Institution (Blinder, 1990) recently published a series of papers by economists and other scholars that
reviewed the effectiveness of pay programs such as profit-sharing, employee ownership, and so forth. A
repon on pay for perfonnance recently published by the National Academy of Sciences (Milkovich &. Wigdor,
1991) places a good deal of emphasis on the imponance of organization differences in studying pay.
Sociologists too have called for researchers to "Bring the rums back in" (Baron &. Bielby, 1980;
Tolben. 1986). Administrative Science Ouanerly (1990, p. 391) recently issued a call for papers to be
published in a special issue on the "Distribution of Rewards in Organizations." The desired emphasis was on
"papers that examine reward-allocation processes or outcomes within one or more or~anization contexts" (p.
391). In the comparable worth area, Hanmann, Roos, and Treiman's (1985) basic research agenda
emphasized the "need to understand bener how wages are set within enterprises" because "although many
assumptions are made about the impact of market forces and competition...Jittie research on wage
determination within rums has been undenaken" (p. 7). Thus, dominant models such as human capital in
economics and status attainment and segmented labor markets in sociology may be giving way to a more
organization-based research focus.
In contrast to some other fields, human resource management has traditionally worked under the
assumption that organizations choose different employment policies and that the organization is the appropriate
unit of analysis in empirical research. There is liule debate about whether significant organization differences
exist and little interest in showing that if such differences do exist, it must be for efficiency reasons. Instead.
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the focus is on developing and testing descriptive models in human resource strategy (including compensation
strategy) (Dyer & Holder, 1988; Milkovich, 1988; Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1987; Foulkes, 1980; Gomez-
Mejia & Welboume, 1988; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Salter, 1973; Weber & Rynes, 1991). A second
focus is 10 use this work 10 build prescriptive models that wiJI inform managers' employment policy decisions
and implementation.
ORGANIZATION DIFFERENCES IN PAY: RECOGNIZING MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS
Although the bulk of theory and research has focused on organization differences in pay level, as
discussed earlier, this is only one of several dimensions of compensation. Further, emerging evidence
suggests that organization differences in pay level may be less pronounced than differences on some of the
other dimensions.
For example, in the Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) study mentioned earlier, organization differences in
pay mix were significantly larger and less well explained by industry, size, and fmancial perfonnance
differences than were differences in pay level. Why might this be the case? One explanation rests on the
idea that there are important product market and labor market constraints on pay level, but not on pay mix.
If an organization's labor costs are higher than those of its competitors, this may be reflected in higher
product prices and, depending on demand elasticity, less ability to compete in the product market. In
addition, there may be a floor below which labor costs cannot be driven without compromising the ability to
hire and retain employees of adequate quality. Taken together, the organization's range of discretion may be
relatively limited in setting pay level. On the other hand, at any particular pay level, an organization can
deliver pay with any number of different programs (e.g., merit pay, team awards, profit-sharing). Thus. pay
mix decisions may nOt be subject to the same degree 10 product and labor market constraints.
Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) also found that organization differences in pay mix were related to
subsequent differences in profitability. Specifically, organizations that relied more heavily on variable pay
plans such as shon term bonuses and long term incentives over a period of several years performed better
than those relying more heavily on base pay. The relatively large organization differences, the theoretical
flexibility in making pay mix decisions. and the consequences of such decisions for organizational
perfonnance all suggest that the real action in compensation research of the future will pertain to the issue of
how pay is delivered (e.g., pay mix), not the amount of pay (pay level). More broadly, 8 focus on pay
delivery (or form) suggests that organization differences in structure and benefits decisions should also provide
fenile research ground.
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We begin with a discussion of organization differences in pay level and then move on 10 the other
dimensions.
Pay Level
Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987) defined pay level as the "average compensation paid by a firm
retative 10 that paid by its competitors" (p. 89). Pay level is a characteristic of the organization (e.g..
. Heneman & Schwab, 1979; Mahoney. 1979a). Conceptually. the term "compensation" includes any direct or
indirect payments 10 employees, such as wages, bonuses, stock, and benefits. In most research, however, only
the base wage or salary is typically measured.J Another limitation of most research is the use of aoss-
sectional data, which ignores the fact that organizations may differ in the timing of compensation payouts
over employees' careers.
Traditionally, much of the literature on pay level has focused on industry differences (Krueger &
Summers, 1988), but more recent work has turned to an examination of organization differences. Although
the fmdings are somewhat mixed, it seems fairly clear that there are often substantial differences in pay level
between organizations within industries (Groshen, 1986, 1988, 1991). The least supportive evidence for
organization differences comes from a swdy by Leonard (1988) of one industry (California electronics finns).
The highly competitive nature of this industry may have reduced organization differences. Groshen's research
using other industries, however, suggests that organization differences in pay level are of a significant
magnitude and persist over time. Leonard (1990), although not placing much importance on them, also found
nontrivial organization differences in pay level in a sample of executives from a broad range of industries.
Finally, Gerhart and Milkovich (1990), using the Cornell Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies
(CAHRS) compensation data base, found significant and stable employer differences in pay level over a five
year period among 16,000 top and middle managers in over 200 organizations and many different industries.
Note that these findings do not indicate that market forces are unimportant. To the contrary, labor
market and product market variables explain a substantial amount of the variance in individual pay (e.g., 78
percent in the Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990 studyV However, the findings also strongly suggest that within the
constraints imposed by market pressures, organizations have considerable discretion in choosing pay level
policies.
Why do employers exercise this discretion? A satisfactory answer must await the development of an
accepted contingency theory. In lieu of this, we briefly describe two general frameworks that have received
significanl attention: efficiency wage and strategy models.
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~fficiency Wages
The basic idea behind efficiency wages is that organizations may choose pay levels that exceed the
market clearing rate as a way of achieving greater efficiency. Four different variants (soning, shirking,
turnover, gift exchange) of the model explain how this might work (see Groshen, 1988).
Soning by Ability (or Adverse Selection). Some employers may choose higher rates of pay as a
means of hiring and retaining higher ability employees. At least two assumptions are required. First, the
employee selecUon sySlem must have sufficient validity. Second, of course, the gain in employee
performance must exceed the added compensation cost. This might occur, (or example, in an organization
where technology or work design is especially sensitive to employee ability.
Shirking/monitoring and turnover. Because worker productivity is often difficult to measure, workers
may have an incentive to "shirk." However, as a counter-incentive, an organization can pay the worker more
than can be obtained elsewhere, which should reduce shirking because the employee will not want to risk
losing this premium wage (Yellen, 1984; Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984). If all finns raise wages, job loss may
further result in unemployment In this sense, "unemployment plays a socially valuable role in creating work
incentives" (Yellen, 1984).3
Gift exchange/sociological morale. Social conventions are the driving force here (Yellen, 1984).
Akerlofs (1984) "partial gift exchange" model suggests that "some rums willingly pay workers in excess of
the market<learing wage; in return they expect workers to supply more effort" (p. 79, 1984). Or, as Yellen
describes it, firms pay "workers a gifl of wages in excess of the minimum required, in return for their gift of
effon above the minimum required" (p. 204). Akerlof cites Adams (1965) work on overreward inequity as
empirical suppon. He also notes, however, that "not all studies reproduce the result that 'overpaid' workers
will produce more" (p. 82).
We make the following observations on efficiency wage models. First, one interpretation of such
models is that if organizations behave in a particular way, it must be for efficiency reasons. Because there is
always the possibility that decision-makers have access to information not available to the researcher, this will
always be difficult to prove or disprove. However, we believe it is more useful to leave open the question of
whether actions are necessarily efficient and let the data provide, to the extent possible, an empirical
assessment of what is efficient and what is not As the so-called post-institutionalists(Segal, 1986) of the
1940s and 1950s demonstrated, it may be unrealistic to assume that efficiency (narrowly defined) is the only
criterion used in making compensation decisions.
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designing empirical research, it will be particularly imponant to measure the key constructs of the theory to
provide a valid test of the theory's predictions. Thus, the need for monitoring, amount of monitoring, and the
likely cost of job loss should be defined and measured..
Although progress in this respect has been limited, there have been some interesting empirical studies
beginning to appear. For example, Capelli and Chauvin (1991) suggest that the basic efficiency wage
hypothesis is that "a wage premium may change employee behavior in ways that benefit the firm" (p. 6).
They tested the hypothesis that unionized manufacturing employees would be less likely to resolve workplace
problems or conflicts using methods that risked job loss when the costs of job loss were high. Specifically,
the grievance procedure was expected to be used more, while absenteeism and shirking would decline. Cost
of job loss was measured as the size of the wage premium (relative to the local market) and the magnitude of
the local unemployment rate. Plants located in different geographic regions and local labor markets provided
the variance in cost of job loss. Their hypothesis was supported. However, two issues with the study should
be noted. First. shirking was not directly measured. Instead, it was proxied by the percentage of workers
dismissed for disciplinary reasons). It is possible that employee behavior did not change, but managerial
behavior did. The weak labor market may have led to management being more aggressive in terms of work
rules, discipline, and so forth. If so, more use of the grievance system (as observed here) could be an
outcome. This suggests the desirability of measuring employee shirking directly in future studies. Second,
the study did nOl indicate whether the greater use of the grievance system in the presence of wage premiums
and high unemployment rates was efficient in any sense.
Groshen and Krueger (1990) tested the idea that wage premiums would be larger in hospitals with
fewer resources allocated to supervision (measured as the percentage of supervisors) because self-supervision
(or self-monitoong) would be greater. In support of their hypothesis, wage level was indeed negatively
related to amount of supervision. However, as they noted, other models could also account for this finding.
For example, organizations that hire lower quality workers would pay them less and might need to
compensate for their Jack of ability by having more or closer supervision. Again, actual measurement of the
central construct (self-monitoring) in future research would help clarify such results (e.g.. Conlon & Parks.
1990).
Although specific tests of the partial gift exchange form of efficiency wage theory have not been
conducted. equity theory research is very relevant. Briefly, it suggests that paying employees more than they
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might initially think they deserve does not have much effect on long-tenn behavior. One reason is lhat
people appear to be very adept at re-adjusting their self-assessments of worth (upwards of course).
Consequently, the feeling of overreward inequity or guilt may often be transitory as would be any increase in
effon to COO1pensaJef(l' it (Miner, ]980).
StrateeY
The genera] idea behind the strategy perspective is that organizations facing similar internal and
external environments have the discretion to choose different compensation policies (Gomez-Mejia &.
Welboume, 1988; Lawler, 1990; Milkovich, 1988; Weber &. Rynes, 1991). Moreover, pay level is only one
of several pay dimensions on which imponant choices need to be made. Different pay strategies that vary
along the level, mix, structure, and benefits dimensions are thought to be appropriate for different types of
organizations. The main contingency approaches to date have focused on matching different pay strategies
based on an organization's stage in the life cycle (e.g., Balkin &. Gomez-Mejia, 1987) or its pattern of
diversification (e.g., Kerr, 1985). (See Milkovich 1988. Gerhart &. Milkovich, forthcoming and Gomez-Mejia
&. Balkin. 1992 for reviews.) In contrast to an efficiency wage perspective, the focus is not limited to pay
level and there is no assumption that the current pay practices of organizations are necessarily efficient
Rather, it is viewed as an empirical question. Unfonunately, as with the efficiency wage model literature,
such evidence is rare. (See Gomez-Mejia, 1992 for a recent exception.)
Although we are not yet to the point of being able to identify and measure all of the relevant
contingency factors, so we can enter them into our computerized expen system (along with a compensation
strategy) and have the predicted consequences output to us, we can identify the other major compensation
decision areas and some of the imponant issues that need to be addressed within each.
Pay Mix
General Issues
Pay mix focuses on how rather than how much employees are paid. Programs such as merit pay,
individual incentives, gainsharing, and profit-sharing are some of the more common ("pay for perfonnance")
programs discussed in this context Single rate systems and pay linked to seniority are other examples of
relevant programs. The Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) study reviewed earlier suggests that organization
differences in pay mix may be relatively large and imponant in influencing organization perfonnance. Pay
mix can have two general types of effects on employee and organization perfonnance (Gerhart &. Milkovich,
forthcoming). First, pay mix can provide incentives and reinforcements for particular behaviors among current
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employees. This tends to be the focus of psychological models such as expectancy theory and reinforcement
theory, as well as the focus of agency theory in the economics and finance literatures. Research on the
effects of pay programs like merit pay, gainsharing, profit-sharing and the like typically work from this
conceptual framework.
Neverthcless, pay mix also has the potential to influence the composition of the current workforce,
just as pay level is hypothesized 10 do under efficiency wage models. For example, an organization that links
pay closely to individuaJ or organization performance may send a different signal (Spence, 1973) to applicants
than one with a weaker pay-performance link (Bretz, Ash, &. Dreher, 1989; Brown, 1990; Hannon &.
Milkovich, 1992; Lauar, 1986; Rynes, 1987), resulting perhaps in the two organizations having different types
of workforces in terms of ability, risk aversion, and so forth. Similarly, different pay systems may contribute
to different types of employees being retained (e.g., Gerhart, 1990).
Another issue that arises in examining the pay mix literature has to do with the appropriate degree of
individuaJ versus group emphasis in pay program design. Deming (1986) has been a vocal critic of pay
programs that focus heavily on rewarding individual level goal achievement. Two of his criticisms are
mentioned here. First, he believes that any individuaJ's performance is largely a function of numerous
"system" factors (e.g., management, supervision, technology), which tend to be beyond the individuaJ's
control. Thus, it is both unfair and unwise to evaluate individuaJ performance. Second, an individuaJ focus
discourages teamwork. As he puts it, "Everyone propels himself forward, or tries to, for his own good. on
his own life preserver. The organization is the loser" (p. 102).
Team or group based pay plans may increase in importance for a number of reasons. First,
comparisons with Japanese organizations suggest that teams playa greater role in the production process. For
example. the MIT study of the automobile industry (Womack. Jones. &. Roos. 1990) found that 69 to 70
percent of workers in Japanese plants in Japan and in North America worked in teams. compared with 17
percent in U.S. owned plants in North America. The strong productivity growth of the Japanese economy
and its well-publicized achievements in industries such as automobiles have contributed to an interest in team-
based approaches in the U.S. In addition, changes in manufacturing technology (e.g.. advanced manufacturing
sechnologies such as just-in-time, flexible manufacturing) have led to teams. interdependence. flexibility. and
decentralization being more important. These factors may not fit we)) with the traditional focus on individual-
based reward systems (Gerhan & Bretz, forthcoming).
A recem study by Dyer and Blancero (1992) provides some evidence on what the future may hold.
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They used a Delphi te(;hnique to obtain projections from 57 panelists regarding how the workplace of a
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hypothetical service company would diffe.r in the year 2000 from today's workplace. Most respondents were
corporate human resource executives (56%), academics (18%), or consultants (12%). For all employee
groups, they found that the importance of individual merit in pay increase decisions was expected to decrease,
while workgroup perfonnance was expected to become more important (see Table 1). In addition, their
results indicated a substantial shift toward the use of variable pay, especially plans that tie pay to farm and
business unit results.
Insert Table 1 about bere
Nevertheless, experience suggests the need for caution in evaluating such predictions. For example,
in a related sbJdy of 12,000 experts worldwide conducted for IBM by Towers Penin consulting, similar
results were found in the U.S. sample. But, ironically, over 80 percent of the 300 Japanese respondents
agreed that greater emphasis on individual merit pay was a strategy that would enhance their competitive
advantage. As such, those wishing to emulate the Japanese are faced with something of a quandary.
In addition, it would be unwise to ignore the fact that individuals differ in terms of their abilities and
skills. When individual differences are not recognized, high performers may move to 8 situation where such
differences are recognized (e.g., Gerhart, 1990; Weiss, 1987). Sports analogies are of some interest because
there are numerous examples of great individual performers being much more highly paid than others on the
team, yet this does not preclude teamwork or success. Rather, in many cases, teammates recognize that the
team would not be nearly so successful if that person were to leave.5 Both teamwork and individual
performance probably need to be recognized.
Evidence on Specific Pay Mix Programs
Most empirical research bas focused on the impact of pay programs on current employees. Several
literature reviews of such programs have appeared since the Ehrenberg and Milkovich IRRA review chapter.
We make use of these and the Gerhart and Milkovich (forthcoming) chapter to highlight the evidence
regarding specific pay plans.
Merit Pay. Although basing the pay of managers and professionals on merit or performance is
typically the stated policy in organizations (Bretz, Milkovich & Read, 1989), questions have been raised about
the extent to which this policy is actually carried out in practice (Lawler, 1989; Konrad & Pfeffer, ]990;
Medoff & Abraham, ]981; Teel, ]986). There has been no comprehensive study of 8 wide range of
organizations that would provide the necessary evidence, but it may be safe to assume that organizations
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differsignificantly in the degree to which pay and merit are closely linked. Moreover, in evaluatingthe
research that is available, Gemart and Milkovich (forthcoming) suggested that much of it has approached the
issue in a less than optimal fashion for two reasons. First, most of the studies have used cross-sectional data,
despite the fact that even small differences in pay can accumulate into large differences over a career (Gerhart
&\ Milkovich, 1989; Gernart &\ Rynes, ]991) and similarly, even "smaIl" links between pay and performance
can compound into significant links over several years (Gerhart & Milkovich, forthcoming; Milkovich &
Milkovich, ]992). Second, and related, performance can have substantial effects on lifetime earnings through
its effect on promotion rates. When these (actors are considered, the estimated link between pay and
performance is usually significantly larger. However, we do not really have any good evidence on the extent
to which employees evaluate pay packages in terms of career earnings.
Merit bonuses (not added into base pay), in contrast, are designed to more closely link current pay to
CUJTel1tperformance because an employee has to re-eam the bonus each year (Newman & Fisher, 1992. This
approach is sometimes suggested as a way to increase "pay (or performance" and enhance motivation.
Another suggested advantage is the fact that fixed costs are kept lower and salary growth can be more readily
controlled. Not surprisingly, however, employees typically do not react favorably to such plans and it is not
clear such an approach makes sense in the context of long term employment relationships where employee
commitment is a goal.
The empirical evidence on the consequences of merit pay is almost non-existent (Milkovich &
Wigdor, 1991). An exception is a study of managers in a single organization by Kahn and Sherer (1990).
They found little effect of merit pay, per se, on subsequcnt performance, but did fmd that managers who had
bonuses closely linked to their performance had higher subsequent performance levels. Obviously, more such
work needs to be done.
Individual Incentives. There is plenty of evidence that individual incentives can have substantial
effects on employee behaviors and auitudes. The problem, however, is that not all the effects are positive.
Quantity of production can often be raised (for reviews see Dyer & Schwab, 1982; Locke, Feren, McCaleb,
Shaw, & Denny, 1980), but may come at the expense of quality, a major problem, particularly in view of the
current emphasis on "total quality managementn Individual incentives also fit poorly with team-based
production and are not applicable to most white collar jobs. Another common roadblock stems from the
difficulty in developing production standards and rates that are accepted as fair by both management and
workers over the long run and the fear of job loss if productivity increases dramatically. Perhaps as a
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consequence, individual incentives have been used successfully in only a fairly smaIl number of cases and
their use continues to decline (Mitchell et al., 1990).
Profit-sharing. Under profit-sharing, payouts are based on organization-wide profits. The plan has
two potentia] advantages. First., it may provide an incentive for employees to act in the best interests of the
orgimization, rather than pursuing narrower goals. Second, by making a ponion of compensation vary with
organization profits, an organization can align its labor costs more closely with its ability to pay. Thus,
during business downturns, it has fewer fixed labor costs.
Weitzman and Kruse (1990) have provided a comprehensive review of profit-sharing research. Based
on previous attitude surveys, they concluded that both employees and employers believe that profit-sharing has
positive effects on organization perfonnance. Further, they found consistent evidence of statistically
significant and positive links between profit-sharing and organization perfonnance, usually defmed as value
added.
Nevertheless, Gerhart and Milkovich (forthcoming) raised some issues that might temper the positive
evaluation reached by Weitzman and Kruse. As one example, the use of value added as a dependent variable
carries potential risks because it is not a measure of physical productivity. Instead, it is defmed as the degree
to which the price of a product exceeds the cost of factor inputs (e.g., labor). Obviously, the price of a
product can be inOuenced by factors other than productivity. Weitzman and Kruse seem to recognize this and
other potentia] problems with the profit-sharing literature. They note that "A limitation of the econometric
Studies is that they shed little light on the mechanisms through which profit sharing may affect productivity"
(p. 139).
The reason for interpreting the profit-sharing research cautiously is that there are both conceptual
problems and roadblocks that have arisen in practice. For example, from a motivational point of view, it is
not clear thai any single employee will see much link between his or her performance and the organization
profits because of the large number of people and factors that influence profits (ie., "line of sight" problem).
This, together with the "free rider" problem suggest that the motivational effect of such a plan may be
limited. In addition, the attempt to make labor costs vary with business conditions has also not worked out
in a number of cases (e.g., the DuPont Fibers unit case). Employees often think profit-sharing is fine when
profits are good because the profit-sharing payments are just "gravy." However, when profits go down and
their pay goes down, serious opposiLion can arise and plans may be scrapped. It is also possible that the
introduction of this sort of risk into employee pay packages may require a compensating wage differential
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(Abowd & Ashenfelter, 1981). Otherwise, employees may gravitate toward organizations that do not require
them to bear such risks. The "signalling"effects of these plans on applicants attitudes and behaviors needs to
be investigated
Final1y, whatever its performance consequences, we note that profit-sharing has also been proposed as
a means of enhancing employment stability (Weitzman, 1984, 1985). The basic idea is that it provides a way
for organizations to reduce labor costs during business downturns without necessarily reducing headcounL
The research to date seems to support this hypothesis (Chelius & Smith, 1990; Kruse, 1991; Gerhart, 1991).
Employee Ownership
Stock Qptions. Stock options permit employees to pW'Chase stock at a fixed price. In the past, they
have been primarily reserved for executives, but some organizations like Pepsi-Cola now give them to all
employees. If the stock price increases, the options can be exercised at the lower price and the employee
makes a profit upon selling the stock. Thus, like profit-sharing, payouts are based on a measure of
organization performance. The potential advantages and disadvantages are also similar. One additional aspect
that deserves mention is the cost of stock options. Sometimes, organizations seem to treat them as having no
cost. In theory, however, they may dilute the value of existing stock or reduce the amount of earnings
allocated to profits. In fact, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, overseen by the Securities and
Exchange Commission) is currently looking into this issue (Cowan, 1992). It is considering changing
accounting rules so that options are charged to compensation expense like other forms of compensation.
~. Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPS) in the U.S. are dermed in the Internal Revenue
Code and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and enjoy a number of tax/financing advantages
(Conte & Svejnar, 1990). They have also been used as a takeover defense under the asswnption that the
employee voting block will be supportive of the management team. ESOPs are unique in several respects,
including the requirement that plan participants (Le., employees) be permitted to vote their securities if they
are registered on a national exchange (Conte & Svejnar).
As with Other organization-wide plans such as profit-sharing and stock options, the motivational
impact of stock ownership is open to question because the employee may see linle connection between his or
her own performance and the stock performance. Nevertheless, the research to date has been "encouraging"
(Hammer, 1988). As is probably the case with other plans (e.g., profit-sharing), however, there is some
concern about simuJtaneity--that actual or expected good stock performance may result in the establishment of
ESOPs (Hammer, ]988).
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An imponant and recurring rmding is rhat there are greater beneficiaJ effects of ownership in cases
where employees participate in decision-making (Conte & Svejnar, 1990; Hammer, 1988). Similarly, Pierce,
Rubenfeld, & Morgan (1991) suggest that employee ownership is most likely 10 influence mOtivation,
attitudes, and behaviors when the "employee-owner comes 10 psychologically experience his/her ownership in
the 'organization." Klein (1987) reports that employee satisfaction under ESOPs is related both to the
monetary and participation components.
Areas of concern with ESOPs include (a) ownership stakes that do not translate inlO voting rights, (b)
the difficulty in diversifying employee pay (or investment) risk, and (c) the cost 10 other stockholders that
arises from the dilution of share value when ESOP shares are not purchased on the market ("Unseen Apples
and Small Canots", 1991).
Gainsharini. In conttast to the typical profit-sharing plan, gainsharing payouts are (a) typically linked
to group or plant rather than organization-wide performance, (b) based on productivity rather than profits, and
(c) disuibuted more frequently and not deferred. Taken IOgether, these differences suggest a greater
motivational impact for gainsharing because a payout criterion like group or plant productivity is likely to be
seen as more controllable by employees than something like organization-wide profits. Not surprisingly, the
evidence indicates that gainsharing has a positive impact on penormance (Hatcher & Ross, 1991; Kaufman,
1992; Schuster, 1984a; Wagner, Rubin, & Callahan, 1988).
Although gainsharing appears 10 have a positive influence on the performance of current employees, a
potential concern stems from our earlier discussion regarding its effects on workforce composition and some
initial empirical evidence that high individual performers may not be more likely 10 leave under such plans
(e.g., Weiss, 1987). If this finding is replicated, research will be needed to evaluate the potential trade-off
between (negative) w<rkforce composition effects and (positive) effects on current (or remaining) employees.
Alternatively, research might focus on the optimal blend of plans (e.g., merit pay, promotion) that reward
individual performance and those that reward group performance (e.g., gainsharing).
Other research issues concern the conditions under which gainsharing is most effective. Gowen and
Jennings (1991, p. 148) suggest that three "socio-psychological conditions--employee identification, ownership,
and commitment" are important characteristics of effective gainsharing prograr(1s. Similarly, Hatcher, Ross,
and Collings (1991) propose a model where "employee suppon for gain sharing" has three determinants: plan-
instrumentality beliefs, affective organizational commitment, and trust. Such hypotheses again underscore the
potential importance of non-compensation factors in determining the success of compensation programs, an
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issue we cover in more depth in a later section.
Pay Structure
Pay structures can be defined in terms of the "may of rates paid for different work within a single
organization." In addition. they "focus attention on the levels. differentiaJs, and criteria used to detennine
thoSe pay rates" (Milkovich &; Newman, 1990, p. 31). To date. much of the empirical research has focused
on relative pay (i.e., differentials), defmed. for example. as the ratio of a position's pay to adjacent positions
in the hierarchy (Jaques, 1961; Mahoney. 1979b) or to the average pay of other positions in the structure
(Pfeffer & Davis-Blake. 1987). As with pay mix. organizations may have considerable discretion in designing
pay structures because many different structures are possible given a particular overall labor cost.
The evidence on organization differences in structure is sparse. However. a recent study by Pfeffer
and Davis-Blake (1990) used a sample of colleges and universities to model the determinants of salary
dispersion (coefficient of variation). Using roughly 20 predictors, including tenure dispersion, percent women.
the distribution of jobs. and size. they obtained R2s of .30 and .46. depending on the time period. By
implication, there remain large unexplained organization differences in saJary dispersion, especiaJly compared
to a pay dimension such as level, for which R2s are typically considerably higher (e.g.. Gerhart &; Milkovich.
1990).
Much of the literature on structures is based on the idea of an internal labor market (ll.M). Work
by Kerr (1954) and others "attacked the uncritical application of the textbook model of supply and demand to
the ILM" (Wachter & Wright, 1990, p. 241). Compared to the external labor market, an ILM allocates and
prices labor (i.e., employees) on the basis of policy, rules, and procedures, and less on the basis of supply
and demand. Market forces in an ILM are largely indirect, except for ports of entry jobs. Although
Doeringer and Piore (1971) incorporated both efficiency and institutional explanations for ILMs, most of the
subsequent economic literature has stressed the efficiency advantages of ILMs (e.g., Azariadis, 1975; Becker,
1964; Williamson, Wachter, & Harris, 1975; see Wachter & Wright, 1990 and Ehrenberg & Smith, 1987 for
reviews). An important starting point for most such models is that employees and organizations "incur
substantiaJ sunk cost investments...[which] are not easily portable across fums Minimizing these sunk cost
losses encourages the panies to maintain their ongoing relationship" (Wachter & Wright, p. 243).
The existence of a long-term employment relationship means that structures must be designed not
only with incentive effects in mind (e.g., Lazear & Rosen, 1981), but aJso with the goal of achieving equity,
fairness, and the favorable reputation that follows. Less complete information being held by one party than
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by the other (i.e., asymmetric information) might permit "strategic behayjor" (i.e., not abiding by the implicit
contract). Wachter and Wright (1990) suggest that "Perhaps the most important disincentive for strategic
behavior is the repeated nature of the ILM relationship. Repeated transactions are less subject to opportunism
than are shon-run relationships" (p. 253).
Although the preceding literature explains ILMs in terms of their efficiency advantages. little attention
is given to how ILMs vary across organizations or what specific decisions are most consequential for
organization performance. The administrative literature (e.g.. Belcher &. AtChison. 1987; Lawler. 1980;
Milkovich &. Newman. 1990; Wallace &. Fay. 1988). for example. suggests that numerous specific decisions
are required. including: using job- or skill-based structmes, the number of separate structures, the number of
steps or levels in a structure. the rate of progression through the structure. and the degree to which pay
differentials represent the external market or use some other criterion (e.g.. internal consistency). LinJe is
known about organization differences in such decisions, let alone their potential implications for performance
(Gerhan &. Milkovich, forthcoming).
New Evidence on Organization Differences: Market Sensitivity
To help remedy the lack of empirical evidence on organization differences in pay structures, we
provide new results on organization differences with respect to the market sensitivity of their pay struCtures.
The compensation literature has long recognized the imponance of both external competitiveness and internal
consistency objectives. The former refers to comparisons between what the organization pays for a panicular
job or skill and what other organizations pay. Internal consistency, by comparison, focuses on within-
organization comparisons of pay for different jobs or skills.
Although the two policies may go hand in hand, they may also conflict. For example, an internal
consistency orientation might argue for vice presidents being paid the same, regardless of the labor market
(e.g., finance, human resources, research and development) or product market (e.g., aerospace, consumer
products). Such a policy may make the most sense in cases where the vice presidents make lateral moves
across functionaJ job areas or business units or where cooperation between vice presidents is important
(Carrol, 1987). However, if other organizations (the "market") tend to pay vice presidents in finance and/or
consumer products more, there will pressure to move away from internal consistency toward an externaJ
competitiveness focus. Otherwise, it may be difficult, for example, to attract and retain vice presidents of
finance in the consumer products business. In such organizations, labor market and product market factors
would playa more imponam role in pay-selling.' In this sense, the pay structure would display more market
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sensitivity.
The focus of the empirical results reponed here were obtained as part of the third author's Master's
thesis (Murray, 1992), and focus on the question of whether organizations differ significantly in the degree to
which they pursue an external competitiveness or market sensitivity strategy, as is suggested by policy-
capturing research of compensation professionals (Weber & Rynes, 1991). If so, futwe research could try 10
ascenain the reasons for such differences and their possible consequences for organization performance.
The data are from the Cornell University Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies
Compensation Database. There are 78,503 observations pooled across multiple years (J 981 through 1985) on
top and middle level managers in 282 fmos. To be included in the sample, an organization had 10 report
data on at least 75 employees in at least two different years.
The measure of market sensitivity was derived in two steps. First, a market-wide equation was
estimated using cash compensation (base salary + short term bonus) as the dependent variable. Second, for
each organization. the predicted cash compensation from this general equation was matched with the actual
cash compensation values 10 obtain an R2 (or coefficient of determination). This, in turn, was used to
measure the correspondence between an organization's pay structure and that of the market as a whole--in
other words, its market sensitivity. To capture product market influences, the general equation included
industry dummy variables. as well as size (sales, employees). Labor market influences were accounted for by
including occupation dummy variables, level of responsibility, general and firm-specific experience, and years
of education.
The results indicated that the mean of the market sensitivity index was .78 with a standard deviation
of .08. With a normal distribution, the 95 percent confidence interval would run from .62 to .96, indicating a
significant range in market sensitivity. An analysis of variance using organization dummies as the
independent variables was statistically significant (F2II,?1211= 357.68), reinforcing the finding of significant
organization differences in maricet sensitivity.
An important criterion in assessing whether patterns are strategic is to examine their stability over
time (MinlZberg, 1987). To pursue this issue. market sensitivity indexes from 1981 and 1984 were used to
obtain a measure of stability. The correlation between the two years was .44. Thus, organization differences
in market sensitivity show some stability, but also significant change. However, it should be recognized that
there is considerable movement of employees into and out of the organizations included in this sample, For
example, using the same sample, Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) reported that about 50 percent of employees
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present in 1981 were not present as of 1985. Combined with the fact that the R2Sare based on modest
sample sizes, there may be a fairly low ceiling on the amount of stability that could be found.' All things
considered, we suggest that the results indicate significant and relatively stable organization differences in
market sensitivity. Given the potential consequences of interna1 consistency and external competitiveness
disCussed above, this probab1y calls for work lhat explores the organization performance consequences of such
differences.
Benefits
Employee benefits add an average of $.38 on lOp of every $1.00 of payroll (U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, 1991), accounting for about 28% of total compensation (EBRI, 1992). Therefore, any discussion
of organization differences in pay must consider differences in benefits. From publicly available data
focussing primarily 00 industry differences, we know that spending for benefits is highest in manufacwring
(31.9%) and lowest in retail trade (22.5%). However, as with pay suuctures, much of the evidence about
organizational differences in benefit costs, forms, and levels of coverage, and their possible consequences may
only be available in the surveys conducted by private consulting firms. For example, Hewitt (1992) reports
that two-thirds of the manufacturers in their survey (approximately 2(0) provide comprehensive medical care
with deductibles. Individual deductibles of $200 (23 percent of the plans) and $100 (29% of the plans) are
most common. Family deductibles varied from $200 (12% of the plans) to $400 (12% of the plans).
Employee monthly contributions for single coverage ranged from none (46%) to $50 and greater (12%).
Both level and growth of benefit costs are noteworthy. In 1935 benefits accounted for less than one
percent of IOtal compensation costs. By 1953 their share was 16%, by 1980 it was 27%. The types of
coverage also changed. In 1960, employers spent 1.1 percent of total compensation on health care, 4.8
percent for retirement, and 2.1% on other forms. In contrast, in 1990, health care accounted for 6.4o/t:,
retirement 8.1%, and other forms 2.2% (EBRI, 1992).
Although there is evidence of a recent slowdown in overall benefit growth relative to total
compensation, even the most casual observer must be aware that health care costs are the notable exception.
According 10 one survey. the cost of health care increased 21% (10 $2313 per employee in 1990, foHowing
increases of 20.4 percent and 17 percent in 1989 and 1988, respectively) (Foster Higgins, 1991). The U.S.
spends about 12% of its gross domestic product on health care. the largest percentage amount of any
developed country.
Despite this large and increasing expenditure of resources, there are 37 million U.S. citizens (14.8Cj{
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of the population) who do not have public and private health care. Most conventional quality indices such as
infant mortality (U.S. ranks highest among developed countries) life expectancy (U.S. ranks sixth out of six
countries for men, foonh for women) and office waiting time per visit (14 minutes) raises questions about the
return on the nation's investment in health care. Finally, according to public opinion polls, U.S. citizens are
less -satisfied with their health care system and more likely to say it needs fundamental change than citizens
in other developed counuies.
Public policy regarding employee benefits is beyond the editor's charge for our chapter. However,
one only needs to consider the effects of changes in the tax code or of the wage and price controls in the
1940's and 1950's to realize that the current public policy debate on health care will shape the costs, forms,
and levels of coverage of benefits offered employees. Further, the GAO recently noted that fuJl taxation of
benefits could raise $91 billion in new tax revenues and... "go a long way toward improving equity" between
benefit recipients and nonrecipients (GAO, 1992). They also noted that it may lead to fewer benefits
provided by employers. However, given the virtual absence of research on organization differences, public
policy formulation will not be weJl informed about the effects that differences in benefits have on employee
behaviors or organization performance.
Employee Perceptions and Preferences
Evidence suggests that employees seriously underestimate the financial value of their benefits and in
some cases are even unaware of their existence. In one study, employees were asked to recall which types of
benefits they received; the average response was only about 15% of the total number of benefits (reported in
Milkovich and Newman, 1990).
The Wilson et al. (1985) study focused on employees' perceptions of their health care insurance
benefits. Employees were knowledgeable about their own contributions, but not about those made by the
employer. Over 90% of the employees underestimated both (a) the cost to the employer and (b) what it
would cost them to provide the benefits on their own. For example, for one health plan, employees estimated
the employer cost to be $22 (the actual cost was $64) biweekly and the market value to be $48 (versus an
actual value of $169). In fact. some employees believed that the employer made no contribution at all to
their health insurance coverage.
One interpretation of such findings is that employers may. to puL it bluntly. be throwing away money
on benefits. If employees do not know the benefits exisL or fail to aWich value to them, the benefits cannot
influence their attitudes or behaviors in any positive fashion. As Lawler (1981) has suggested. any action that
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would enhance employee knowledge would help strengthen !he impact of benefits. He advocated increasing
employee choice (e.g., by using cafeteria or flexible benefits plans) as one approach. Organizations have in
fact moved in this direction, with 61 percent now offering such plans, according to the Hewiu survey of 944
large organization (Hewitt. 1991). Preliminary evidence suggests that flexible benefits do positively influence
benefits satisfaction (Barber, Dunham, and Formisano, 1990). other actions aimed at enhancing employee
knowledge include greater use of copayments and deductibles. The effects of such approaches await
evaluation.
There is longstanding evidence of significant employee differences in benefit preferences (Nealey,
1963; Mahoney, 1964; Nealey and Doodale, 1967; Huseman et al., 1978; Davis, Giles, and Field, 1985 and
1988; Stonebraker, 1985). Although interpreting these results is often complicated because of a lack of
adequate controls (e.g., differences in the experience or use of different forms, employer differences in
benefits packages and communication approaches), some findings seem robust (and perhaps even obvious to
some): older workers tend to place more value on pensions, women tend to prefer more time off, and the
number of dependents is related to the desire for health insurance.
Such employee differences, of course, lend greater weight to the need for offering employees a
choice in the design of their benefits package. The increasing diversity of the workforce further reinforces
this suggestion. Employers hope that flexible benefits plans will help control costs and enhance employee
satisfaction by increasing employee knowledge and improving the fit between employee preferences and
benefits.
Survey and anecdotal evidence suggest that employee reactions to flexible plans are positive and that
medical care costs are lower under such plans. However, little empirical research has taken advantage of the
field opponunities offered by employers' shift to flexible plans (see Barber et al. for an exception). Little is
known about why some employers shift and others do not. Even less is known about how employees make
the choices that are so fundamental to such plans, or whether different choices are made (Barringer,
Milkovich, and Mitchell 1991).
Barringer et al. (1991) studied the actual decisions made by employees (n= 1,5(0) among six health
care options under a flexible benefit plan offered by a large manufacturing company. Employee choices were
modelled as a function of employee and plan characteristics. Results indicated that employee decisions among
multiple health plans were significantly influenced by option costs (i.e., premium, deductibles, and coinsurance
amounts) and employee demographics (i.e., employees' age, income, marital status, and gender). As age and
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salary increased, the probability of selecting a reduced (less expensive) level of health care coverage
decreased. The probability of selecting a lower cost alternative was greater among married employees and
female employees.
Another study conducted by IBM reponed that the selection of high coverage options did not drop
when employee costs wese raised, but employee satisfaction with their health care benefits actually increased.
Simultaneously, the organization had launched a massive communication effon, including lake-borne videos.
These findings suggest that employee expectations about their benefits are adaptive and communication effons
may have an influence. In addition, communication and employee involvement may be all the more
imponant, since apparently employees underestimate the value and may not even by sensitive 10 organization
differences in benefits. Increasing the knowledge through communication and involvement may increase
benefit value to employees. In a recent study, knowledge and satisfaction with benefits increased for
employees who used computer-based spreadsheets and an expen system compared 10 employees who did not
have access to these decision aids (Hannon, Milkovich, and Sturman, 1992).
Satisfaction. Attraction. and Retention.
Benefits are believed 10 influence everything from employee satisfaction, health, and well-being to the
decision 10 join and remain with an organization. Again, with some exceptions, research into the
consequences of employee benefits is lacking.
Heneman and Schwab (1985) and others have found that satisfaction with benefits is a separate and
independent dimension of pay satisfaction. Other findings suggest that benefit satisfaction increases with
improved coverage and decreases with cost shifting to employees (Dreher, Ash, and Bretz, 1988). A more
complete review of this reseMCh is in Gerhart and Milkovich (fonhcoming).
Benefits are also believed to influence job choice decisions. The typical study involves asking
graduate swdents to nmk Older the importance attached to various factors influencing their job choice (see
Huseman, et al., 1975). Benefits' last place rank is consistent with employees' tendency 10 underestimate
rheir value (Mahoney, 1964; Huseman, et al., 1978; Pergande, 1988). In a recent Gallop poll, respondents
claimed that they would require $5000 more in extra pay 10 choose a job without pension, health, or life
insurance.
There is increasing evidence that pensions and health care reduce voluntary turnover (Schiller and
Weiss, 1979; Mitchell, 1982, 1983). Schiller and Weiss reponed that turnover was not only influenced by the
existence of pensions but also by vesting and employee contributions. Mitchell found that pensions were less
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likely to influence the turnover of women than men (1982). Luzadis and Mitchell (1991), using the
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longitudinal file of collectively bargained pension plans, reponed that the natW'e of pension plans acts as an
incentive to encourage workers with high tenure to retire. They suggested that employers, through the design
of their pension and retirement incentives, can shape the demographic composition of their workforce.
However, a problem is that the optimal configuration (experience, age, etc.) is seldom attended to. Rather,
the objective is more often simply to reduce labor costs (i.e., replacing older, more expensive employees with
ymmger, less expensive ones). The effects on overall economic performance needs to be examined.
Explanation of Differences
The recurring theme of this chapteJ' is to put the organization back into research on employee
compensation. This is panicuIarly imponant in the case of increasing our knowledge about employee benefits.
Explanations of organizational differences in benefits can be derived from a number of different economic and
organizational theories. Barringer and Milkovich (1992) examine how current theories, drawn from economics
and organizational behavior, explain the observed patterns in the adoption and design of a specific benefit
practice-decisions about flexible benefits.
Flexible benefits were only offered by 17 major U.S. employers in 1981 and only 99 by 1983, but
by 1992 over 1400 plans had been implemented. Survey evidence suggests that the incidence is highest in
the service industry. Sixty-three percent of the top 100 commercial banks, 46% of the top 50 financial firms,
and 46% of the top 50 utilities currently offer flexible plans (Hewiu, 1992). This is also evidence of
considerable variation in the design of these plans.
How do different theories account for this diffusion of flexible benefits? Barringer and Milkovich
(1992) consider agency and transaction cost models from economics as well as institutional and resource
dependency models from organization behavior. All rest on the premise that organization performance can
depend on motivating important employee behaviors, and while they are not in complete agreement, all
suggest that the ease of monitoring work effort is important. On the other had, these theories disagree on the
extent to which organization decisions are influenced by external versus internal conditions. The institutional
model suggests that employment relationships are determined primarily by forces in the organization
environment such as tax code changes, industry competitiveness, and labor market patterns. In contrast, the
resource dependency, agency. and transaction cost perspectives all presume that internal conditions affecting
contingencies in employment relationships primarily determine how an organization will design its
compensation, including benefits.
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AssumpLions about the determinants of organization decisions about practices such as flexible benefits
vary widely across models. Two conflicting themes emerge: decisions about the adoption and design of an
innovation are rationally related to pressures in the environment; or organizations base their decisions on what
others are doing (i.e., benchmarking), regardless of the effects on firm performance.
Consistent with the flJ'Sttheme, the resource dependence, agency, and ttansaction cost perspectives all
imply that organizations can improve productivity by adopting practices that will motivate employees' work
and auendance behaviors. Explanations of fmns' decisions about flexible benefit plans thus require an
examination of the factors related to the extent of organizations' reliance on and control or influence over
these important behaviors. In conttast, the institutional perspective implies that organizations are less
concerned with improving technical efficiency than with reaching an accommodation with their environmenL
This theory suggests than an organization's "field" as well as factors related to pressures to conform and
organizations' immunities to these pressures can help explain decisions about flexible benefits plans.
None of the theories seem to offer a complete explanation of fmns' decisions about flexible benefits
plans. The institutional model does not consider "late adoption" decisions that may be related to rational
considerations. Further, application of this model may be difficult because of an organization's fteld is not
~ily identified, and because the criteria are unclear for determining when institutional forces begin to exert
more influence than rational, performance-related considerations. The resource dependence, agency, and
ttansaction cost perspectives seem to be more helpful in explaining the design than the incidence of flex
plans, and each seems to focus narrowly on a single aspect of the employment relationship. Thus, for
example, the transaction cost perspective focuses on the fmn-specificity of work skills and the ease of
monitoring productive efforts, and does not consider other factors (e.g., task uncertainty, task centrality) that
would also make high tmnover and low work motivation costly. If expanded, however, the ttansaction cost
approach might prove to be the most parsimonious of all the models, since it recognizes not only the
importance of efficiency as an important guiding force, but also the impact of environmental constraints
beyond the organization's control. It could therefore incorporate the constraints imposed by institutional
environments, as well as those imposed by contingencies in employment relationships that are implied by the
resource dependence and agency models.
Benefits provide a unique context for testing a variety of economic and organization theories.
Hypotheses about the determinants and consequences of organization differences in benefits can be derived.
There is sufficient evidence that significant differences among organizations exist Further, the dramatic
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changes currently underway in the benefits organizations offer provide research opponunities. Their increasing
cost only adds to the timeliness of benefits research.
So what are the potential baniers? First, the data requirements are considerable, since numerous
variables are implied by llIe theories, and large longitudinal sample sizes are required. Moreover, testing
hYPotheses regarding tW'ganizarlondifferences requires data across several finns. Obtaining benefits data is
proving to be a challenge, since some fmos consider it proprietary, and not all of it is well documented in
existing information systems. Nevertheless, our survey of the research leads us to conclude that compared to
the rest of compensation, we know very little about how employee benefits are determined or what their
effects are. The opponunity to make a contribution by informing decision makers and adding to the body of
knowledge is substantial.
PROCESS ISSUES: PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNICATION
Lawler (1980, p. 33) suggested that there was too often an assumption in employee compensation
research and practice that "if the right technology can be developed, the right answers wiD be found." But,
he argued that "there are no objectively right answers," and thus, process factors such as panicipation and
communication are also important. The distinction between distributive equity and procedural equity (e.g.,
Greenberg, 1986; Folger & Konovsky, 1989) similarly suggests the need to treat outcomes and the process
used to decide on (and administer) such outcomes as somewhat independent issues. Textbooks and chapters
in the employee compensation field now regularly point to process issues as a key strategic decision area
(Gerhart & Milkovich, forthcoming; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Lawler, 1980, 1990; Milkovich &
Newman, 1990). Economists too have begun to focus more attention on the likely importance of process
issues (Blinder, 1990).
Consistent willi our earlier discussion of compensation dimensions, there seem to be substantial
differences in the decisions made regarding participation and communication both within (e.g., Cutcher-
Gershenfeld, 1991) and between organizations (Goll, 1991). The Janer study suggests that environmental
conditions (e.g., foreign and domestic competition, deregulation, industry structure) are not very helpful in
explaining differences between organizations in the degree of participative decision making. In contrast, top
management ideology and values did explain a significant portion of such differences. Therefore, management
may have considerable discretion in its decisions regarding employee panicipation in decision making and
other aspects of general employee relations. (On this point, see also Kochan, Katz, & McKersie. 1986;
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Kochan & Dyer, 1992; Lewin, 1987).
We focus on two process related issues: participation in decision making and
c:ommunication/information sharing.
Employee Participation in Decision Making
Levine and Tyson (1990) summarized two "economic" models of participation in decision making
(PDM). The first is based on an agency theory approach. Delegation of decision making by a principal to
an agent raises the question of how the principal can encourage the agent (whose interests differ to some
degree) to act in the best interests of the principal (i.e., the agency problem). As the number of decision
makers increases, so do monitoring costs (Jensen & Meckling (1979) and transaction costs (Williamson,
1975). Thus, from this perspective, PDM would be inefficient However, Levine and Tyson argue that both
the agency and transactions costs frameworks can be extended to incorporate the fact that employees have
knowledge about the workplace and behavior of fellow employees that managers do not and PDM may
increase the commlDlication of such information. The implication seems to be that employees will engage in
self- and peer-monitoring.
But, as Levine and Tyson (1990) point out, there is the question of why employees would be
motivated to share information and facilitate monitoring. Based on economic theory's focus on monetary
incentives, the experiences of other industrialized nations (e.g., Japan), and psychological theories of PDM,
they suggest that four factors are necessary for PDM to succeed: "gainsharing" (to provide a monetary
incentive), and three actions geared toward building an environment that fosters trust and cooperation: long-
tenn employment relations, measures to build group cohesiveness, and guaranteed individual rights for
employees.
Perhaps the most innuential psychological theory of PDM and its consequences is the Locke and
Schweiger (1979) model, which is built around an expectancy theory perspective (Vroom, 19(4). PDM is
hypothesized to increase productivity and quality by enhancing both employee ability and motivation. Ability
effects occur through the greater sharing of information, which provides a bener understanding of the job and
a greater opportunity for employees to contribute ideas for improvement Motivation is enhanced because of
a greater sense of control, ego involvement, group pressure and support, and higher goals. These, in turn,
reduce resistance to change and increase commitment to decisions and changes. Finally, there can also be
positive effects on attitudes for those who value empowerment, respect, independence, and so forth. These
effects may also contribute to lower levels of absenteeism, turnover, and connict. (See Hammer, 1988 for a
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related model in the context of gainsharing.)
Discussions of PDM in the compensation literature often take a relatively narrow focus, usually
emphasizing employee involvement in the design and implementation of pay policies (Gomez-Mejia &. Balkin,
1992). Greater involvement has been linked to higher pay and job satisfaction (Jenkins &. Lawler, 1981),
presumably because employees have a better understanding of and greater commitment to the policy when
they are involved (Gomez-Mejia &. Balkin, 1992).
More broadly, however, PDM may have important effects on effectiveness that go beyond its role in
facilitating the success of pay programs. According to Blinder (1990), for example:
worker participation apparently helps make alternative compensation plans...work better--and
also bas beneficial effects of its own !t appears that changing the way workers are ~
may boost productivity more than changing the way they are paid... (pp. 12-13).
Looking beyond the compensation literature, there has been a substantial effon to document the
effects of employee participation. Several literature reviews have examined the relationship between employee
participation in decision making and outcomes such as performance and satisfaction (e.g., Conon, Vollrath,
Froggatt, Lengnick-Hall, &. Jennings, 1988; Gershenfeld, 1987; Levine &. Tyson, 1990; Locke &. Schweiger,
1979; Miller &. Monge, 1986; Wagner &. Gooding, 1987). These reviews suggest several conclusions. First.
participation seems to have a small to moderate positive relationship with both performance and satisfaction.
Second, however, the magnitude of these relationships seems to vary significantly depending on how
participation and the outcome variables are measured. When both are based on employee self-reports, the
relationships with performance and satisfaction appear to be four times as large on average (Wagner &.
Gooding, 1987). Thus, studies relying exclusively on self-repon data need to be interpreted cautiously
because they may significantly overestimate the strength of the participation effect.
A third conclusion, suggested by both Cotton et al. (1988) and Levine and Tyson (1990) is that
different forms of participation may have very different effects. (See Leana, Locke, &. Schweiger, 1990 for a
criticism of this conclusion and the rebuttal by Cotton and his colleagues, 1990). Both reviews include a
number of types of participation studies such as Scanlon and employee ownership plans that were excluded in
the aforementioned meta-analyses (because of the confound between participation and other factors like pay).
For example, Levine and Tyson (1990) conclude that "Participation is more likely to produce a significant,
long-lasting increase in productivity when it involves decisions that extend to the shopfloor and when it
involves subslantive rather than consultative arrangements" (p. 204).'
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A recent study by CUlCher-Gershenfeld (1991) provides some interesting evidence on the effectsof
broad changes in workplace relations, which he defmed in tenns of conflict and conflict resolution, shop-
floor cooperation, forma] and informal autonomous worker activity, and information sharing. Using
longitudinal data on 2S work areas at Xerox, he found that higher levels of these workplace relations
variables were associated with lower costs, as well as improvements in cost and quality.
Blinder's (1990) suggestion that employee PDM may have a greater impact on organization
effectiveness than pay decisions, per se, I3ises the broader issue of the importance of pay decisions relative to
other employee relations decisions such as broad PDM. In addressing this issue, it is useful to re-visit the
literature on gainsharing. In that conlext, the question has been raised about the degree to which it is the
monetary component or the contextual conditions like participation that contribute to increased performance
levels (Hammer, 1988; Milkovich &. Wigdor, 1991; Mitchell, Lewin, &. Lawler, 1991).
Although it is difficult to find studies that disentangle pay and non-pay program effects, some
evidence clearly supports the idea that pay is only one part of the story. For example, Pritchard, Jones, Roth,
Stuebing, and Ekeberg (1988) conducted a 23 month study of the effect of gainsharing incentives, goal
setting, and feedback in 5 separate organizational units at an Air Force base in the southwest United States.
Although it is not completely clear from the article, the goals and feedback components appeared to include
participative elements, in addition to information sharing. They used a baseline period of 8 months, followed
by 5 months of feedback only, 5 months of feedback + goal-setting, and finally, 5 months of feedback +
goal-setting + incentives. They observed large increases in productivity due to feedback alone (50% over
baseline), feedback + goal-setting (75% over baseline), but little additional effect of incentives. Although it is
probably incorrect to interpret the results as meaning that pay, per se, is not important (Pritchard et al. note
the possibility of ceiling effects on performance and that incentives may have been necessary to sustain the
substantial feedback and goal-setting effects over the longer run), the study does reinforce the notion that pay
is not the only means of influencing behavior.
That said, however, evidence (some of which was reviewed earlier) indicates that pay alone can have
important effects on behavior. Schuster (1990) has argued that gainsharing plans have often worked well in
cases where me main (or entire) focus was on the monetary aspect, unaccompanied by employee involvement
or participation. Consistent with this argument, a recent literature review (Kaufman, 1992) of severa]
Improshare plans, which emphasize pay, but not employee involvement (see Fein. 1981 for a description of
the program), found positive effects on employee performance.
Pay, Performance, and Participation 28
Similarly, Wagner et al. (1988) studied the implementation of a nonmanagement group incentive
payment plan that appeared to encompass liuIe beyond changes on the monetary dimension and found a
substantial increase in productivity, as weD as significant declines in labor costs and grievances. They noted,
however, that employees bad positive experiences with incentive plans in other company plants, which may
have generated greater UUStin management and, in turn, more successful implementation of the new pay plan.
In other words, we again see that both pay and the accompanying non-pay context may mauer.
Gowen and Jennings (1991, p. 162) argued that previous studies "have not examined the effects of
participation independent of the effects of other pay plan attributes." Their study of several departments in an
automotive parts plant found that adding a participation component (monthly meetings with management to
discuss the gainsharing plan and ways of increasing productivity) to a gainsharing pay incentive plan raised
productivity.
Hatcher et al. (1991) note that many gainsharing plans (e.g., Scanlon) incorporate a formal employee
suggestion system. Ideas for cutting costs, changing work methods and so forth can be solicited and later
evaluated by teams of management and nonmanagement employees for possible implementation. Hatcher et
al. focused on identifying the factors that motivate employees to submit suggestions. An interesting rmding
was that the desire to earn a monetary bonus appeared to be much less important than a number of non-pay
factors, particularly the desire for influence and control in how their work was done. They suggest that this
rmding "fails to support the position that gainsharing works by appealing exclusively to the financial interests
of employees via the bonus" (p. 32).
Mitchell et al. (1990) examined the effects of what they termed economic participation (coverage by
profit-sharing, gain-sharing, stock options, ESOPs, and production bonus or incentive plans) and noneconomic
participation (i.e., of Ibe type studied in the general participation literature) on productivity (net sales per
employee) and profitability (return on investment and return on assets) using responses from 495 business
units.' Cross-sectional regressions found support for positive effects of non-economic participation on
productivity, but not on profitability. Economic participation was not related to either profitability or
productivity, although breaking out the separate programs provided some evidence of positive effects of profit-
sharing on each. Trend regressions, in comparison, provided consistent support for the effects of both types
of participation on profitability and productivity. As such, the results again suggest the importance of both
pay and accompanying process factors such as participation.
Communication and Information Sharing
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Gerhart and Milkovich (forthcoming) suggest that the way pay information is commWlicated to
29
employees may have a significant effect on their attitudes and behaviors. Communication can pertain to
either distributive or proceduraJ aspects of compensation decisions. With respect to the former, for example,
some organizations choose to carefully manage information regarding how pay compares with that of other
relevant organizations. Employee reactions are likely to depend not only on their actual pay, but also on
what comparisons Ibey believe are relevant and the information that is available. Consequently, Capelli and
Sherer (1990) fOWld, for example, that the lowest paid employees were actually the most satisfied with their
pay because they used different comparisons.
Effective commWlication about procedural issues can also be important A fairly dramatic example in
this regard was provided by Greenberg (1990). He found that employee theft increased significantly after a
15% across the board pay cut was instituted. Most interesting, however, was that the manner of
commWlicating the pay cut had a substantial impact on both pay equity perceptions and actual theft rates.
With the "adequate explanation" experimental group, management provided a significant degree of information
to explain the rationale behind the pay cut. h also made a point of expressing its remorse. The "inadequate
explanation" group received much less information and no indication of remorse. The control group received
no pay cut (and thus no explanation). Although the control group and two experimental groups began with
the same theft rates and equity perceptions, after the pay cut, the theft rate was 54% higher in the adequate
explanation group than in the control group. But, in the "inadequate explanation" condition, the theft rate was
141% greater than in the control group.
Two studies by Morishima examined the effects of information sharing on the wage negotiation
process (199la) and firm performance (I99lb). Comparing his survey results from Japan to those of Kleiner
and Bouillon (1988) who used U.S. data revealed that information on firm profitability, employee productivity,
and labor cost was much more likely to be shared with workers in Japan than in the U.S. Morishima
suggests that there are at least two potential effects of such information. One is that workers will use such
information to make greater wage demands and obtain a greater share of the organization's profits.
Alternatively, the sharing of information may engender greater goal alignment, trust, cooperation, and a
reduction in the union's information disadvantage in negotiation. The result may be greater ability and
motivation to perform effectively (see Locke & Schweiger model above), as we)) as greater "responsibility" in
terms of avoiding wage demands that could detract from the long term viability of the organization. Of
course, the greater commitment to employment security (i.e., the long term relationship) in Japan would
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presumably play an important role here.
Morishima's (19918, 1991b) fmdings generally support the notion that information sharing influences
both wage negotiations and organization performance. Information sharing decreased the (a) length of
negotiations. (b) the union's initial percentage wage increase demand. and (c) the fmal percentage wage
increase settlemenL In addition, Iha"e were improvements in labor cost, productivity, and profitability.
InlereStingly. the Klein and Bouillon (1991) study found that information sharing led 10 higher wages and
benefits using U.S. data. Morishima (199lb. p. 482) suggests that the difference in results may be due 10 the
fact that other aspects of industrial relations in many U.S. organizations does not include other aspects (e.g.,
employment security) of "the comprehensive labor relations suategy used by Japanese management" and that
"a piece-meal application of Japanese industrial relations techniques" is not likely to be successful in the U.S.
A final note concerns the possibility of inconsistent trends in employee relations and the design of
pay programs. There is much discussion of late around the idea of employee "empowerment"-giving
employees the resources they need to make more key decisions. Recall that Levine and Tyson emphasized
the importance of long-term employment relations. group cohesiveness. and individual rights for employees in
building an environment conductive to PDM. Yet, Dyer and Blancero (1992) Workplace 2000 study found an
expectation among respondents of growth in the use of part-time. temporary. and fixed term contract
employees. especially at lower levels in the organization. A significantly smaller percentage of employees
were expected 10 the spend their entire careers with the organization in the future.
At the same time. Dyer and BJancero (1992) Workplace 2000 study found that HR experts
anticipated greater use of variable pay. and a shift to group and organization criteria in determining the
payouts. A theme of the present paper has been that compensation operates in the context of a relatively
long term employment relationship or contracL In fact, this may be a precondition for employee acceptance
of risk in their pay packages. their willingness to incorporate group and organization goals. and their active
acceptance of participative arrangements. One interpretation of these trends (Dyer. cited in Bureau of
National Affairs. 1992) is that as an employee. "your employment is more at risk and your pay is more at
risk." At the same time organizations are pursuing this transfer of more risk to employees. organizations are
trying to send the message that they "want dedication to the company with high levels of quality. quantity,
innovation. speed, and adaptiveness." The bottom line is that there may be "an imbalance."
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Our review suggests that there has been a renewed emphasis on the importance of organization-based
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research on the determinants and consequences of employee compensation decisions. There has also been a
good deal of recent empirical work, as well as helpful literature reviews that have contributed significantly to
our understanding of the consequences of specific pay for perfonnance programs (e.g., profit sharing,
gainsharing, eIC.). In general, the ~ suppats the effectiveness of such programs (relative to situations
whete pay is not linked 10 petfonnance). However, there are several areas that require further study.
First, there is almost no research that compares the relative effects of different pay for performance
programs (Milkovich &. Wigdor, 1991). Similarly, there has been little empirical research that identifies the
conditions most conducive to the success of different programs (or combinations of programs). In other
words, further development and testing of contingency theories is greatly needed (Gerhart &. Milkovich,
fonhcoming; Gomez-Mejia &. Balkin, 1992).
Second, the focus of the great majority of research (except in the pay level area) has been on the
effects of pay programs on the attitudes and behaviors of current employees. However, it is also quite
possible that different pay programs have very different effects on self-selection by employees. Consequently,
the composition of the workforce (and its corresponding abilities, attitudes, etc.) may differ significantly across
different pay programs.
Third, although there is now a substantial body of evidence regarding the importance of organization
differences in pay level, as well as a developing literature on pay mix differences, systematic examination of
the magnitude of organization differences in pay suuctures and benefits is almost non-existent. Consequently,
evidence on the performance consequences of such differences is also quite limited.
Fourth, in designing empirical research on organization differences in pay decisions and their
consequences, severa] factors should be kept in mind. For example, although we have focused on
"organization" differences, substantial variation in pay decisions can exist within organizations as well.
Groups, plants, and business units within a single organization can work under very different employment or
compensation arrangements. There are also potential advantages in using within-organization designs (e.g., the
ability 10 control for faclOIS specifJC 10 the organization as a whole). In addition, 10 strengthen causal
inferences, there is a need to study the process by which pay decisions influence distant outcomes such as
organization perfonnance. This means including potential mediating variables such as employee attitudes and
behaviors, as well as quality and productivity measures. Further, the use of longitudinal data is helpful in
distinguishing between transitory and lasting effects of changes in compensation programs.
Fifth, there are many assumptions and beliefs regarding trends in the employment relationship and the
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design of compensation.For example,there is a good deal of discussion about the growth in team-based
production, variable pay, and moving away from individual level perfonnance in making pay decisions.
.
Down the road, evidence that documents or refutes past predictions would be useful in providing additional
perspective on the accuracy of such predictions.
Sixth, based OIl bod1 the lirerature and discussions with compensation professionals, it is clear that the
monetary component of pay programs is only one pan of what is important in influencing employee attitudes
and behaviors and organization performance. Process issues such as participation in decision ma1cing and
communication also appear to be critical in many cases. It would be useful to obtain a better understanding
of the interplay between the process and monetary components. For example, to what extent are their effects
additive or inteJ'aCtive?
Finally, we note that there are several areas not addressed in this chapter such as executive pay,
international aspects of compensation, and equal employment opportunity issues. We refer readers to Gerhart
and Milkovich (forthcoming) for a discussion of these issues. That chapter also contains a heuristic model of
the determinants and consequences of employee compensation decisions. Further infonnation on other
important aspects of compensation such as tournament models and agency theory is provided in companion
chapters in this volume.
% Pay
Increase
BaSedOn: Executives Managers Professional Suppon
rrechnical Staff
122l ZQOO 1221 2QQQ 122l ZQOO 122l ZQOO
Individual
. Merit 100% 83% 100% 80% 100% 72% 100% 71%
Individual
Seniority 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3
Pay for
Knowledge 0 3 0 4 0 15 0 14
Workgroup
Performance 0 13 0 15 0 12 0 12
Source: Dyer and BJancero, 1992, p. 64
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Table 1
Projections of the Basis of Pay
Pay, Performance, and Participation
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Footnotes
I.There are other considerations in measuring pay level. Organizations often have multiple pay levels. varying
across business units (product markets) and functional or skill groups (labor markets). Further. studying pay level
with cross-sectional data may pose a problem if aganizations differ in the sequencing of workers' pay (e.g..
Ehrenberg &. Smith. 1988. p. 421; Lazear. 1979; Wachter &. Wright. 1990). Mae broadJy. money is only one
of many aspects of an employment relation. Other relevant factors include security. challenge. co-workers. and
so forth.
2.Institutiona1 thetties (e.g.. Zucker. 1987) also emphasizes the pressures (in this case. nonnative rather than
market) on organizations 10 adopt policies that are similar 10 those of other organizations. Thus. it would seem
10 suggest relatively few differences in organization pay practices. As such. the findings regarding organization
differences in pay level. and to a greater degree. pay mix (discussed above). are inconsistent with the theay.
3.Many readers will note the resemblance of this idea 10 Marxist discussions of the role of the "reserve army."
4.One possibility is 10 measure shirking using confidential self-assessments (e.g.. Judge. 19..J or peer assessments.
Alternatively. Iabonuory experiments provide ample opportunity for measuring such constructs (e.g.. Conlon &.
Parks. 1990).
S.Some examples include: Mark Messier and the New York Rangers (hockey), Michael Jordan and the Chicago
Bulls (basketball). and Roger Clemens and the Boston Red Sox (baseball).
6.Note that anOlher possible outcome is that both internal equity and external equity (in a sense) are achieved by
paying employees who command a premium in the market at the market rate and paying other employees at the
same level (i.e.. "overpaying them"). This, of course. could prove very costly and make it difficult to compete
in Ihe product market (Lawler, 1986).
7.The stability is less than that found by Gerhan and Milkovich (1990) for base pay and pay mix dimensions.
However, they focused on organization averages. which are probably inherently more stable than an R2-based
index.
8.Levine and Tyson define consultative arrangements as providing an opportunity for employees to express
opinions, but management makes the decision. Quality circles are one common example. In conttast, substantive
participation, although concentrating on the same types of issues, provides greater employee influence. An
example would be formal work teams that are able to aganize their work with minimal supervision.
9.The final respmse rate for d1is data set was 6.5 percent and may raise concerns regarding selection bias
(Ehrenberg, 1990). Another concern raised by Ehrenberg is that the degree of economic and non-economic
participation may be endogenous. In the present sbJdy (and many others). this raises questions about the direction
of causality.
